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National Red Cross Societies and Prisoners of War in Russia, 1914–18

One of the ironies of war is that it creates mutual interests among enemies. It also creates common problems, the solution of which requires co-operation between parties intensely engaged in each other's destruction. War further complicates matters by rupturing diplomatic, postal and personal communications required to address the problems. To an unprecedented degree this occurred in the first world war, which trapped hundreds of thousands of civilians in hostile territory and carried millions of soldiers into prisoner-of-war camps. These were crises for which no unilateral political or military solutions were available. Most historical writing about such matters concentrates on the Western front, but it was in the Eastern theatre where most of the POWs and civilian detainees of that war were captured and where the greatest number perished. It was there that the Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires dissolved, leaving their war captives unprotected until new regimes could return them to profoundly changed homelands. Through this turmoil, the belligerent powers improvised remarkable arrangements for reciprocal co-operation to ameliorate the hard lot of prisoners of war. The same was done in the West as well, but geography stamped the process of reciprocal action with unique characteristics in the East.

There were established diplomatic procedures for addressing such matters but little common understanding about how to apply them in such an unprecedented scale of warfare. In time of war, representatives of neutral states ordinarily acted as protecting powers to look after the interests of belligerent states in the territory of their enemies. They handled communications between the enemy governments and represented legal, economic and personal interests of their nationals.

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This was arranged through bilateral agreements subject to approval of all governments involved and could become very complicated. For example, in 1914 the United States represented German and Austro-Hungarian interests in Russia, whereas Spain represented Russia in Germany and Austria-Hungary. After the United States ended its neutrality in 1917, Sweden took over German interests in Russia and Denmark protected Austro-Hungarian interests, while Spain continued to represent Russia in Berlin and Vienna.[1]

Less formal but often more useful in arranging discourse between enemies concerning humanitarian matters were the Red Cross and other philanthropical associations. From its headquarters in Geneva, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) encouraged co-operation amongst the various national Red Cross societies, although it had no authority over them. The ICRC had strong contacts in Russia and conducted inspection tours of prisoner-of-war camps there in 1915 and a relief and rehabilitation campaign for stranded Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in Siberia after the war. For the most part, however, it left these regions in the care of national Red Cross societies of neutral countries.[2]

National Red Cross societies generally raised money for their own humanitarian work, but in time of war they had strong bonds with their national governments, especially with the war ministries. Care of wounded soldiers and other war victims was a special calling of Red Cross societies. They were bound by the mandate that the sick and wounded of all sides receive equal care and that the sign of the Red Cross be respected in battle zones and elsewhere. Red Cross societies of neutral countries had a double neutrality, so to speak, and the American, Danish and Swedish Red Cross societies became significantly involved in care of prisoners and other victims of war in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Serbia and Russia. At the request of the ICRC, the Swedish Red Cross developed a special competence in delivery of food and clothing packages to prisoners of war in Russia, and the Central Powers and the Danish Red Cross concentrated on postal deliveries to and from the eastern regions.[3]

While the United States remained neutral, the American Red Cross (ARC) struggled to find its own role. In 1914 it sent sixteen medical teams to Europe, one of which encountered an unenthusiastic reception in Russia. Nevertheless, with encouragement from President Wilson, the ARC sent two more delegations to Russia in 1915. The latter were intended primarily to aid prisoners of war.[4]

During the first world war, millions of soldiers became prisoners of

war and hundreds of thousands of civilians were interned as enemy aliens. Germany captured over a million and Austria-Hungary just under a million Russians and Russia took perhaps two million prisoners, most of them Austro-Hungarians. In addition to its military prisoners of war, Russia held some 200,000 German and just under 100,000 Austro-Hungarian civilians who had been stranded travellers, hostages and persons removed from the war zones. The Germans held several hundred thousand internees, including East European migratory workers and persons separated by battle lines from their home authorities.[5]

The multitude of prisoners overwhelmed facilities for their care, especially after long sieges and hard campaigns like those in East Prussia in 1914, Galicia in 1914–15, and the Carpathians in 1916. When captured, most prisoners were exhausted, hungry and very often wounded. Thereafter they suffered grievously from make-shift transportation, cruel treatment or neglect, and shortages of food, medicine and clothing. Early in the war, shelter and sanitation were usually inadequate and epidemics always threatened. True and false stories of political exploitation and deadlier atrocities against prisoners circulated widely and the home governments reacted sharply with protests and reprisals.

These governments demanded that their neutral protecting powers inspect prisoner-of-war facilities, report findings, and take measures to improve conditions. This heavily burdened the staffs of embassies and consulates with unaccustomed tasks. In Petrograd, care of prisoner-of-war issues consumed four-fifths of American embassy staff time. Ambassador George Thomas Marye issued desperate appeals for more personnel and volunteers to collect and distribute financial aid, medicine, food and clothing. The American Red Cross attempted to respond to this crisis.[6]

In 1915, the ARC in China assembled relief packages collected by expatriate Germans and Austrians in East Asia and sent its volunteers into Siberia to distribute them.[7] The chief of the volunteers from China was Roger Ames Burr, an American professor of German at the National University at Peiyang. Even with the full support of the American consul at Vladivostok, Burr had difficulty getting travel clearances from the Russians. So did Dr William Warfield, who arrived in Vladivostok on 9 September 1915 as a representative of the Secretary of State. Warfield proposed to work in Siberia while a medical team under a Dr Snoddy entered European Russia via Petrograd.

Warfield obtained authorization to inspect camps in eastern Siberia and to distribute gifts, which he did between November 1915 and February 1916. Experienced in Red Cross work in Germany, he considered himself a judicious and diplomatic delegate, but feeble Russian responses to a typhus epidemic in Stretensk shocked him into taking abrasive action. Bypassing the American ambassador in Petrograd, he appealed directly to Washington to 'bring pressure on highest imperial authorities to grant necessary permission [to administer typhus serum in the Siberian camps] without formality or delay'.[8] Warfield sent other reports to the ambassador, urging drastic improvement of facilities and the assignment of one of Dr Snoddy's medical units to the Siberian camps. Russian authorities resented the pressure. The Foreign Minister accused Warfield of anti-Russian propaganda and demanded his recall. This brought Ambassador Marye a reprimand from Washington and he retired shortly thereafter. The Russians then expelled all American Red Cross doctors and nurses from Russia, allegedly because they had come to Russia from Germany and were therefore prejudiced from the start.[9]

This was a feeble pretext, since delegations of German, Austrian and Hungarian Red Cross nurses (always called sisters) had arrived in Petrograd on the same day that Warfield landed in Vladivostok. And on 24 February 1916, the day before the Russian Foreign Office demanded Warfield's recall, the war ministry approved a second round of visits by German and Austrian Red Cross sisters, this time with twice the personnel of the 1915 round. These sisters arrived shortly after the last of the repudiated American Red Cross workers departed.[10]

The sisters were authorized to travel with delegations to all major prisoner-of-war facilities and to regions where interned civilians were assigned. These inspection tours had been negotiated through Danish, Russian and German Red Cross channels and endorsed by the Austrian and Hungarian Red Cross societies. In 1915, Germany and Austria-Hungary each exchanged three of these delegations with Russia. Each delegation consisted of a Danish Red Cross officer, a liaison officer from the host country, and a Red Cross sister. Members were hosted by the Russian Red Cross, greeted by a member of the ruling family, briefed on procedures, and supplied with clearances and tickets. Their assigned itineraries were to be completed in two to four months. Their duties were to inspect camps, hear complaints, make recommendations to local authorities and high-ranking military officers of the host countries, and submit their findings to the

Danish Red Cross. Given the close ties between national Red Cross societies and their own war ministries, it must have been clear that the sisters would also make full reports to military authorities at home. The Danes were to deliver copies of the reports to authorities on both sides of the conflict.[11]

Although the reports were generally fair and well supported, they were extremely critical of Russian administration. Some Russian officials responded angrily and regarded the sisters as spies or propagandists. Others co-operated. Complaints by the sisters directly to the Russian general staff effected the removal of a few commanders and helped produce substantial reforms in camp administration, which the sisters of the 1916 round later verified. Press coverage was restricted, but some propaganda about the sisters' reports found its way into print before official publication by the Danish Red Cross in 1917.[12]

There were some extraordinary persons amongst the visiting sisters. An Austrian delegate in the 1915 round was Anna Revertera, the daughter of long-time Habsburg representative to the Vatican. She had directed Warfield's attention to conditions in Stretensk and caused an uproar by accusing the German sisters of neglecting Austrian prisoners.[13] Princess Cunigunde von Croy-Dülmen went beyond normal inspection work when she arranged for a famous Russian defence attorney to appeal the death sentence of a young Austrian soldier accused of espionage. He got the sentence reduced to two months in prison.[14] Princess Croy exposed a conspiracy against Danish Consul Wadsted, a great friend of the prisoners at Omsk. She took strong exception to Russian policies to recruit and reward Czech and other Slavic prisoners for disloyalty towards the Habsburg monarchy.[15]

Countess Pauline Stubenberg relied on close relatives in Russia to obtain personal favours. She varied her itinerary to visit her nephews in the officers' camp at Omsk and helped arrange special permission for another sister of the delegation, her niece Nora Kinsky, to remain in Russia to attend prisoners for the duration of the war. Countess Kinsky spoke most of the languages of the Dual Monarchy and quickly learned Russian; she communicated readily with the prisoners and received optimal co-operation from the Russians because of her Slavic nationality. Her motives for remaining in Russia were not entirely altruistic. A daughter of the grand nobility of Bohemia, she had no qualms about badgering high government officials. She got Alexander Kerensky to arrange the transfer of her

brother and her fiancé, also a prisoner at Omsk, to her hospital at Astrakhan.[16]

Hungarian Baronin Andorine von Huszar of the Hungarian Red Cross was a productive negotiator in spite of her overbearing and meddlesome ways. At Krasnoyarsk, she took it upon herself to replace the senior Austrian prisoner, a colonel she thought incompetent, by requesting the Russians to transfer an Austrian general into the camp. She quarrelled with the Danish Red Cross representative in Petrograd and refused to accept the first Danish officer-guide assigned to her delegation because his 'Jewish ancestry and appearance' would make it impossible to deal effectively with the Russians.[17] She denounced two Russian doctors by name and demanded their removal. More positively, she proposed the exchange of tubercular prisoners for internment in a neutral country and served as an official observer on the Invalid Verification Commission in Russia in 1917. Having participated in a Russian–Austrian agreement to station permanent Red Cross delegations in enemy territory, she became a semi-official representative of all prisoners of war in Russia. She was on hand in Petrograd in January 1918 for special prisoner-of-war negotiations supplementing the Brest–Litovsk treaty talks.[18]

The German nurse, Erika von Passow, was less fortunate. She went to Russia three times and disappeared during the Russian Civil War while trying to exit Turkestan via Persia. Anni Rothe visited prisoners in industrial worksites in the Ukraine and brought home valuable information about the Russian wartime economy. Anne-Marie Wenzel, Magdalene Walsleben and Emma von Bunsen impressed Russian authorities as well as prisoners and brought about significant improvements in Russian prisoner care.[19]

German Countess Alexandrine von Üxküll-Gyllenband was also a formidable negotiator. She was one of the 1915 delegates who obtained an extension of her stay to tour Ural and Siberian camps in the spring of 1916. Working with her Danish officer-guide Captain G.C. Muus, she initiated talks that led to the 1916 round of sisters' visits. Danish Red Cross headquarters resisted participating in a second round of reciprocal sisters' visits, but the Prussian war ministry requested Üxküll and Muus to deal directly with the Russian chief of staff, General Belaev, bypassing the Danish and Russian Red Cross organizations as well as the foreign ministries of all three countries. These negotiations were successful and the Danish Red Cross reluctantly agreed to sponsor the 1916 tour. Russian author-

ities grudgingly made travel arrangements while searching for a way to sabotage the enterprise.[20]

The most famous and beloved Red Cross nurse working in Russia was not directly affiliated with the visiting sisters' teams. She was Elsa Brändström, the daughter of the Swedish ambassador to Petrograd. She began as a volunteer with Swedish Red Cross teams that distributed entire trainloads of clothing, medical supplies and food directly to prisoners in the camps. She distinguished herself by making eloquent appeals for financial aid from abroad and intervening on behalf of prisoners in dozens of camps. She worked in grievously deficient hospitals, shared the living conditions of the prisoners, including a bout of typhus and many months of confinement by the Czechoslovak Legion as an alleged spy. She became the unofficial historian of the captives in Russia and the patroness of their widows and orphans. To the survivors of the camps, Elsa Brändström was 'the Angel of Siberia'.[21]

The visiting sisters inspected scores of camps, worksites and hospitals, and helped improve morale and living conditions for hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war and internees in Russia. Although the suffering and mortality of captives in Russia were enormous during the first world war and relief efforts were never carried out without friction and difficulty, the European sisters obtained co-operation from Russian authorities. By comparison, the Americans during their period of neutrality from August 1914 to April 1917 had limited success.

American consular staffs worked hard and probably saved thousands of lives through distribution of relief funds. Yet, with the exception of Moscow Consul General John Snodgrass and his staff, they were distrusted by captor and captive alike.[22] Ambassador Marye lamented that the official protector of Germany and Austria-Hungary could not wrest from the Russians permission to do charitable works while Swedes and Danes, and even Germans and Austrians, conducted large-scale programmes for captives in Russia.[23] Part of the problem was the inexperience of Marye and his diplomatic and consular staff. Almost all were appointed in 1914 and there was a nearly complete turnover in the following year and a half. The ARC was even less experienced in Russian ways, and its delegates in their zeal found themselves wrongly perceived as instruments of German policy.[24]

After the Warfield débâcle, Marye's successor, David Francis, managed to re-establish a modest humanitarian programme for the

American Red Cross in Russia by reassuring Russian authorities that there would be no further criticism of Russian policies or actions.[25] With its entry into the war in April 1917, America relinquished its role as a neutral protecting power. The ARC mission ceased caring for German and Austrian prisoners until ARC units attached to the American expeditionary forces in North Russia and Siberia brought them back into contact with the captives. In 1920, the ARC Siberian commission participated in repatriation of the Czechoslovak legionnaires and other Central Powers' prisoners.[26]

The Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) delegates were generally more successful than the ARC in dealing with captives in Russia. Their work was highly esteemed because they resided in or near the camps, knew the prisoners personally, kept their money out of Russian hands, and avoided filing critical reports. Their work was certainly not hindered by YMCA director A.C. Harte's direct appeal for support to the imperial family, especially the tsar's mother.[27]

The inefficacy of American Red Cross prisoner-relief efforts in Russia was partly due to the oft-repeated complaint that few of the Americans could speak or read Russian or German, not to mention Magyar. Lacking also were common social and cultural perspectives or mutual Russian–American experience in public affairs. Russian bureaucrats led Americans in circles and courtly politics bemused them. When President Wilson appealed directly to the tsar on 15 April 1915, he acted in a way the Russians understood, but his rhetoric confused the issue. He asked the tsar to grant the American Red Cross the right to distribute money, medicines and supplies sent by friends to prisoners in Siberia. That was acceptable. However, he closed with a flourish of humanitarian eloquence that fell somewhat on the egalitarian side:

> I make this inquiry and request very earnestly, not as the chief official of my Government, but only as a servant of humanity, with no political purpose, of course, and as a friend who would help if he could, and who shares with millions of his fellow-countrymen the desire to assuage, wherever it is possible to do so, the inevitable miseries of the present war.[28]

Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov responded on behalf of the tsar, addressing the appeal and the rhetorical justification separately. If Wilson was acting as the official protector of German and Austrian interests, reciprocity would be necessary; if his appeal was based on general principles of humanity, reciprocity need not be required. In any case, the visiting organizations would be bound by Russian military regulations.[29]

This interpretation left a loophole for military authorities to restrict American visits without directly disobeying the tsar. First, the Foreign Office insisted on reciprocity, which was difficult to arrange because Spain, not the United States, represented Russian interests in Vienna and Berlin. Then, when Germany agreed to fund American Red Cross work among its nationals in Russia, Petrograd refused to reciprocate, even after the American Red Cross offered to donate $10,000 of its own money. Other technicalities served as excuses to prevent inoculations of prisoners by any American Red Cross doctors or nurses. Wilson had requested permission for American associations to 'distribute medicines'. The Russians insisted that this did not authorize them to 'practise medicine' by giving inoculations. This they alleged to be contrary to military regulations.[30]

The Americans learned only indirectly that these regulations — if they existed — did not prevent Dr Thorvald Madsen, director of the Danish State Serum Institute in Copenhagen, from immunizing scores of thousands of prisoners against typhus in Turkestan and the Caucasus during the summer and autumn of 1916. Russian authorities even closed some unhealthy camps on Madsen's recommendation. Moreover, they agreed to the formation in the camps of German POW medical teams, consisting of one doctor and ten medical aides for every 2,500 German inmates.[31]

While the Americans had great difficulty obtaining clearance for a few carloads of food and clothing,[32] the Swedish Red Cross managed to distribute a total of 41 trainloads, including 1,016 railcars of supplies sent from Germany and Austria-Hungary to prisoners of war in Russia.[33] Strongly supported by Ambassador Brändström in Petrograd, Swedish Red Cross delegates delivered directly to the prisoners a total of 506,000 complete uniforms, 1,275,000 suits of underwear, 350,000 blankets, 105,000 packages of medications, bandages, disinfectants, serum, medical instruments and food. They also distributed money supplied by the prisoners' home governments.[34]

The Scandinavian Red Cross societies also experienced extreme difficulties with Russian bureaucrats, but counteracted them with powers that the Americans lacked: personal influence in the highest places and the knowledge and will to take advantage of it. The Danish Red Cross was protected by its president, Prince Valdemar, the brother of King Christian X. Their sister was called Dagmar in Denmark but in Russia she was known as Maria Fedorovna, the mother of the tsar and patroness of the Russian Red Cross. One of

Maria Fedorovna's nephews was the very active president of the Swedish Red Cross, Prince Carl. Another nephew was Prince Max of Baden, president of the Red Cross Society of Baden, later to become the last chancellor of the German Empire.

Maria Fedorovna was nearly seventy years old in 1916 but still vigorous and devoted to her Red Cross work. She initiated the sisters' tours and promoted them — and other Red Cross programmes — in every way she could.[35] Cavalry Captain Victor O.J. Philipsen, head of the Danish Red Cross office in Petrograd, frequently travelled to her residence in Kiev to plead for help in bypassing the recalcitrant bureaucracy. Maria Fedorovna also had family connections with German Emperor William II and Empress Augusta Victoria. These contacts were sensitive in time of war, but nevertheless enabled Augusta Victoria to seek her help when the 1916 sisters' tour became stalled.[36] Maria Fedorovna enjoyed formidable influence over the tsar and had many loyal supporters in high places. Without her the sisters' tours could not have taken place.

Visiting sisters were quick to use their own family connections in Russia. Princess Croy, Countess Stubenberg, Countess Kinsky and Countess Revertera regularly consulted relatives to reach over the heads of Russian officials. They and Countesses Horn, Üxküll and Huszar bore themselves as aristocrats and lorded it over persons of lesser social status, regardless of official rank or function. This carried weight in Russia before the revolutions. It was an advantage the Americans, at best foreigners of high bourgeois standing, never had.

There is another reason why the German and Austro-Hungarian sisters were able to conduct effective on-site inspections in a hostile land: they were women. Under the war ethic, men of enemy nationality could not be welcomed for such purposes on enemy territory, but women could. These were educated women trained in nursing, experienced in medical administration and well informed about sanitation and nutrition. They managed large inventories of gift packages and substantial sums of money for which they had to account. Some of them wielded far-reaching power over enemy personnel and kept a sharp eye for signs of disloyalty among their own countrymen in the camps. They were hard-driving and often abrasive and bossed men around, but they functioned within clearly understood roles of patriotic, upper-class women in a profession that was their own.

To the captives, the sisters represented home as idealized in reveries they cultivated in the long dreariness of camp life. Almost all

prisoners were stale and bitter from what they called 'barbed wire sickness' and thoroughly tired of each other's company; among them no man could generate such excitement or improve morale so dramatically as a woman could. Even those of radical social persuasion recalled the sisters' visits as high points of their time in captivity. They wrote poems, performed dramatic skits, and concocted elaborate ceremonies and even practical jokes to mark these occasions.[37]

The visiting sisters' programmes were reciprocal projects. Equivalent numbers of Russian Red Cross sisters went to Germany and Austria-Hungary at the same time in similar delegations. Under Danish Red Cross auspices, they toured dozens of camps, distributed gifts and money, heard complaints, made recommendations and published their findings. They criticized German and Austro-Hungarian administration in specific camps and the host countries responded by making improvements.[38]

One of the most remarkable Russian sisters was Catherine Samsonova, the widow of the ill-fated general who lost his army and took his own life at the battle of Tannenberg in August 1914. She later volunteered to nurse disabled Russian prisoners interned in Denmark.[39] Others were Princess Marie Galitsina, who founded a Red Cross hospital in Moscow, Praskovie Alexandrovna Kasem-Beg, head nurse of the St George Hospital in Petrograd and lady of the court of the empress, and Vera Maslennikova, who also went to Denmark in 1917 and remained there after the Bolshevik revolution.[40] Sister Alexandra Romanova took upon herself an additional vow of reciprocity. After returning from her tour in Austrian camps, she accompanied the Thorvald Madsen medical mission to Turkestan. Through the Duke of Oldenburg, head of the Russian sanitation service, she and Sister Maslennikova obtained authority to inspect and deliver relief supplies and to effect immediate changes, even to dismiss or arrange the recall of camp officials in Turkestan. She then led an inspection delegation into the construction camps of the Petrograd–Murmansk railroad. There she prevailed upon the military to remove the sick and wounded to safer camps, though unfortunately not before thousands had perished.[41]

Construction of the Murmansk line was of the highest strategic importance and foreign inspectors were kept out, which enabled unscrupulous contractors to exploit the workers — including thousands of prisoners of war — beyond endurance. In 1916 an eye-witness smuggled out a report of horrible conditions at these worksites, which

led to a series of German reprisals against Russian prisoners. The Russians in turn applied counter-reprisals that threatened to erode the restraints upon which the survival of the captives depended. The Prussian war ministry, recognizing that it had overplayed its strength by initiating reprisals, now used its Red Cross connection to control the damage and end the cycle of reprisals.

It prevailed upon Princes Carl of Sweden and Valdemar of Denmark, protectors of their respective Red Cross societies, to intervene by requesting the tsar to remove German prisoners from the Murmansk project and arranging for the Russian and German emperors simultaneously to cancel the reprisals.[42]

The text of the emperors' simultaneous proclamations had actually been drafted in the war ministry in Berlin by a Lieutenant-Colonel Bauer, who had also written the telegrams sent by Princes Carl and Valdemar. The plan worked in one sense: it ended this particular series of reprisals between Russia and Germany. However, the Russians again found a loophole. They removed the Reich Germans from the Murmansk line but, since the telegrams written for the princes mentioned only Germans, the tsar's order did not apply to Habsburg subjects, who formed the great majority of workers involved. Danish minister Harald Scavenius confronted the tsar directly on this matter and was told that he had 'signed only for Germans'. Prince Carl expressed regret to Princess Croy that the original proposal had referred only to German prisoners, but he did not admit that the entire agreement had been crafted in Berlin.[43]

There was more to reciprocity than personalities. The contesting states valued the welfare of their prisoners in enemy hands, even though they could do little to bring about victory. Prisoners also had value to their captors as workers and as virtual hostages to coerce favourable behaviour by their enemies. The war ministries controlled facilities for their captives and used these powers to protect their own nationals in enemy hands. This involved enormous systems of communication, supply and finance, which were co-ordinated with close attention to the enemy's administration of comparable systems.

From this emerged a special style of reciprocation, a form of discourse not always expressed in the usual vehicles of international negotiation. The discourse was indirect, with a vocabulary of hostility unlike the transparent courtesies of formal diplomacy. It being the function of war ministries to oppose the enemy, the hostile side of the discourse was proclaimed directly and in strong language. When the parties wanted to reach agreement with the opponent, they did so

indirectly, through modulations of action or inaction or through discreet third parties. As official protecting powers could only properly be reached through formal diplomatic channels, which the military did not always trust, the war ministries used the national Red Cross societies for work that might be considered embarrassingly humane.

In Austria, the Tenth Section of the war ministry designated special political groups to handle reciprocity concerning prisoners of war. Ernst Ritter von Streeruwitz directed these units. The Austrian and Hungarian Red Cross societies were separate entities, but both were under the official protection of Archduke Franz Salvator. The Austrian Red Cross operated the prisoner-of-war information bureau on behalf of the war ministry and notified enemy governments of the identity of each person captured. This work led to the control and censorship of mail as well as the collection and shipment of packages for prisoners, which in turn engaged the Red Cross in reciprocity negotiations. The Hungarian Red Cross handled mail to Magyar-speaking prisoners in Russia. Both societies, as well as German Red Cross groups, forwarded letters through the Danish Red Cross and packages through the Swedish Red Cross.[44]

In Germany, the *Unterkunftsdepartement* of the Prussian war ministry handled this. It was directed by Colonel (after 1917 General) Emil Friedrich, who worked closely with the Red Cross through the *Central-Comité der deutschen Verbände vom Roten Kreuz* in Berlin, the *Frankfurter Verein vom Roten Kreuz* (FVRK), and the *Hamburger Landesverein vom Roten Kreuz* (HLRK). The *Central-Comité* was more of a liaison than a co-ordination agency, as the regional Red Cross societies in Germany were autonomous. By agreement, the HLRK was primarily responsible for service to German captives in Russia.[45]

In Russia, delegation of authority for reciprocal actions concerning prisoners of war was less clear. Early in the war, a branch of the Moscow city government established an Aid Committee for Prisoners of War, with an office in Copenhagen. Although it functioned until 1919, this agency was at first ineptly directed and came under the leadership of a Russian Pole on the payroll of the Prussian war ministry. Established to facilitate communications with Russian prisoners of the Central Powers, it became heavily burdened with reciprocal arrangements to get mail to German prisoners in Russia. In 1918 the Bolsheviks attempted to use the Copenhagen office to combine relief work with political guidance of Russian prisoners in Germany.[46] The Russian Red Cross, like other national societies, was

primarily concerned with the treatment of Russian wounded, but also provided a prisoner-of-war information bureau and a liaison between foreign Red Cross societies and Russian military authorities.[47]

In prisoner-of-war reciprocity matters, the war ministries of enemy states frequently communicated with each other through Red Cross societies, bypassing their own foreign ministries. German Foreign Office staff members, who regarded diplomacy by such amateurs as dangerous, were not invited to attend (or rather invited not to attend) a meeting of Red Cross delegates in Stockholm scheduled for April 1916. Here delegations of the German, Austrian, Hungarian, Russian and Swedish Red Cross were supposed to conclude a previously-drafted agreement on the care of prisoners of war. Since there had been prior agreement in principle and on most of the text, it seemed a routine matter, but an unexpected submarine incident moved the Red Cross negotiations into the realm of wider diplomacy even before the meeting convened.

It was reported that on 30 March 1916 a Turkish submarine had sunk the Russian hospital ship *Portugal* in the Black Sea, killing a number of Russian Red Cross workers. On orders from Petrograd, the Russian delegation refused to participate in the conference until all the Red Cross organizations present officially expressed regret for the sinking. The Hungarian Red Cross did so promptly and its Austrian counterpart hesitated. But the Germans refused, claiming that their Turkish allies had attacked a legitimate target, since the hospital ship had not displayed a red cross. This recalcitrance caused a furore at the Stockholm conference, offended its host Prince Carl and embarrassed the Central Powers' delegations by underscoring tensions within the alliance. In Berlin it intensified friction between the Foreign Office and the War Ministry, which blocked proposals for a face-saving statement of regret phrased to avoid insulting the Turkish ally. The Foreign Office was especially eager to have done with this particular submarine issue because a far more serious one was in the making. On 24 March a German submarine had attacked the French channel steamer *Sussex*. By the time of the *Portugal* sinking, it was feared that American President Wilson would take strong action which might lead America into the war. The Foreign Office eluded that outcome by wringing from the admiralty an assurance that surprise attacks by submarines against merchant ships had been forbidden.[48] It apparently received no word from the admiralty that the culprit in the *Portugal* sinking was not a Turkish submarine at all. It was in fact the German *U-33*, under the command

of Kapitänleutnant Gansser.[49] Concealment of this information kept the *Portugal* incident from causing a serious dispute in major diplomacy where it could have produced far graver results than the disruption of a Red Cross conference.

In Russia, the apology issue delayed final arrangements for the 1916 round of sisters' tours. Not even Maria Fedorovna could move Russian officials to authorize new tours before the resolution of the deadlock in Stockholm. The Russians made some propaganda points and the Germans buried the *Portugal* incident. Then, long after the official date of 15 May, the Red Cross delegates signed the Stockholm protocol and went forward with subsequent negotiations on prisoner-of-war reciprocity.[50]

One would expect such reciprocity to have ended in 1917, when revolution swept away the monarchy with its aristocracy and 'parasitic' superstructure. The Russian Red Cross was profoundly restructured and the status of prisoners of war changed drastically.[51] Even so, time-honoured Russian methods of going over the heads of administrators passed slowly and humanitarian societies as vehicles for indirect discourse between opponents survived for a while. Foreign Red Cross workers, with all of their upper-class orientation, continued to function in Russia.

After hard bargaining on implementation of the Brest–Litovsk treaty, Lenin's government co-operated with German and Austro-Hungarian commissions sent to repatriate civilian internees and military prisoners of war. These commissions were divided into field subcommissions, staffed in part by German and Austrian Red Cross professionals. Their assignment was to feed, house, assemble and evacuate prisoners of war. The subcommissions set up assembly centres throughout European Russia, Turkestan and Siberia and worked closely with Danish and Swedish Red Cross delegates. The subcommissions included Sisters Bunsen, Huszar, Üxküll, Walsleben, Wenzel, and Elsa Brändström. They evacuated most of the prisoners and internees from European Russia before the Central Powers collapsed in October and November 1918.[52]

Local soviets and commissars often refused to acknowledge the subcommissions' authorization papers, especially when they carried sums of money and began evacuating 'internationalist' comrades. Internationalists were released prisoners of war whom the Bolsheviks had recruited into political and military units to help secure the revolution in Russia before returning home to spread revolution there.[53] Although local administration in revolutionary Russia was

even more chaotic than it had been under the tsar and networks of aristocratic influence were demolished, the time-honoured methods of dealing with bureaucracy worked for a while. The repatriation subcommissions appealed on numerous occasions over the heads of local soviets to Trotsky, Chicherin and other high Soviet officials. The appeals were not always successful but, even in revolutionary chaos, the top Bolshevik leadership co-operated. In 1918 the Soviet regime was eager to get rid of the prisoners before the Allies could make trouble about them. This failed when civil war and Allied intervention isolated Siberia and Turkestan and stranded thousands of prisoners and those who came to fetch them. They shared with the Russians the agonies of the civil war. Most of the stranded Red Cross sisters nursed wounded prisoners, soldiers of various factions and other victims of Russia's chaos until their repatriation in 1919.[54]

Reciprocity in the inspection and care of prisoners of war engaged bitter enemies in recognizing common interests outside of military conflict. Opposing war ministries — sometimes behind the backs of their own foreign ministries — addressed these common interests through diplomatic legerdemain or good-faith negotiations channelled through neutral governments and national Red Cross societies. Pre-war agreements at Geneva and the Hague having proved inadequate to deal with the massive scale of new prisoner-of-war issues, the participants improvised solutions during the war. Working outside or on the fringes of diplomatic channels, applying devious and sometimes haphazard methods, they developed reciprocal programmes and worked out bilateral and multilateral agreements that substantially ameliorated conditions among prisoners of war in Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary. In this, national Red Cross societies played a large role, a role they were not to replay in the second world war.

Notes

In the following notes, archival and special collection sources are designated as follows: BA — Bundesarchiv-Koblenz, especially Bestände R 67 (Archiv des Ausschusses für deutsche Kriegsgefangene des Frankfurter Verein vom Roten Kreuz/ Archiv für Kriegsgefangenenforschung) and R 85 (Restakten des Auswärtigen Amts: Rechtsabteilung und Handelspolitische Abteilung). BAMA — Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv-Freiburg, especially Militärgeschichtliche Sammlung (MSg) 200 (Elsa

Brändström-Gedächtnis-Archiv). NA — US National Archives-Washington, especially Record Group 59, Department of State decimal file no. 763.72114 (designator number for first world war prisoners of war). This file is also available on NA microfilm publication M-367. RA — Rigsarkivet-Copenhagen, especially Privater Institutioner: Dansk Rode Kors (DRK), 10.001.A and 10.001.B. W-K — Hans Weiland and Leopold Kern (eds), *In Feindeshand: Die Gefangenschaft im Weltkriege in Einzeldarstellungen*, 2 vols, Vienna: Bundesvereinigung der Ehemaligen Österreichischen Kriegsgefangenen, 1931. A collection of over a hundred studies and accounts by former prisoners of war. DanRK — *Berichte über die Besichtigung der Gefangenenplätze durch Abordnungen des dänischen Roten Kreuzes* (Copenhagen 1917). These are variously titled reports in German and French submitted by German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian Red Cross nurses who travelled in enemy territory under Danish Red Cross sponsorship. Copies are available in BAMA MSg 200/236 (Bib) and RA DRK 10.001.A/157.

1. See William McHenry Franklin, *Protection of Foreign Interests: A Study in Diplomatic and Consular Practice* (Washington 1946), which covers the basic regulations and methods; Richard B. Speed, *Prisoners, Diplomats, and the Great War: A Study in the Diplomacy of Captivity* (Westport, CT 1990) surveys and synthesizes prisoner-of-war diplomatic issues and practices during the first world war, with special strength in discussion of the Western front.

2. See André Durand, *From Sarajevo to Hiroshima*, vol. 2 of *History of the International Committee of the Red Cross* (Geneva 1984), 74; Leopold Kern, 'Das Internationale Komitee vom Roten Kreuze in Genf und seine Tätigkeit für die Kriegsgefangenen', W-K,II, 277–80; George Montandon, *Im Schmelztiegel des fernen Osten: Geschichte der sibirischen Mission des Internationalen Komitees vom Roten Kreuz zu Gunsten der österreichischen und ungarischen Kriegsgefangenen März 1919 bis Juni 1921* (Vienna 1923). Odon Abbal, 'Les prisonniers de la Grande Guerre', *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains*, 37 (1987), 5-29, calls attention to ICRC reports and publications relating to its inspection of 300 prisoner-of-war camps. Geoffrey Best, *Humanity in Warfare* (New York 1980), 355, laments restraints on use of ICRC archives.

3. See *Meddelelser vedrorende Rode Kors Krigsfangeafdeling (Christiansborg) Oktober 1914–31 December 1917* (Copenhagen 1918); Ernst Didring, *Sveriges Hjälp till Krigsfangarna: Berättelse över Svenska Röda Korsets Hjälpkommittes for Krigsfanger verksamhet under aren 1915–1919* (Stockholm 1919), 7–11. See also the following in W-K, II: Elsa Brändström, 'Das Rote Kreuz in Russland', 282–7 and Thorsten Wennerström, 'Das Schwedische Rote Kreuz in Russland und Sibirien', 288–90.

4. See Foster Rhea Dulles, *The American Red Cross: A History* (New York 1950), 120–37 and Ernest P. Bicknell, *In War's Wake, 1914–1915: The Rockefeller Foundation and the American Red Cross Join in Civilian Relief* (Washington 1936), 142–3; 226–7.

5. For notes on statistics on prisoners of war in Russia, see Speed, 16, 194–5 and Gerald H. Davis, 'Deutsche Kriegsgefangene im Ersten Weltkrieg in Russland', *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen*, 1982, no. 1, 37, 45n. and 'The Life of Prisoners of War in Russia, 1914–1921', in Samuel R. Williamson, Jr and Peter Pastor, *Essays on World War I: Origins and Prisoners of War* (New York 1983), 190n.

6. George T. Marye, *Nearing the End* (Philadelphia 1929), 86.

7. The expatriate German group that collected these supplies was the *Hilfsaktion*

für deutsche und österreich-ungarische Kriegsgefangene in Sibirien operated by Elsa von Hanneken in Tientsin. This was an effective relief organization but Frau von Hanneken disliked Americans and inadvertently roused Russian suspicions against them. See BA R 85/3917–3919 and BA R 67/327 and 1149.

8. Warfield to Secretary of State, 17 January 1916, NA 763.62114/1167 and 1284.

9. Warfield to Marye, 12 January 1916, NA 763.72114/1278; J.C. White memorandum on care of German and Austro-Hungarian interests in Russia, 15 April 1916, -/1603; Francis to Secretary of State, 28 August 1916, -/2011; Sofie L. Danner to Countess de Rosty-Forgach, 17 August 1916, BA R 67/326.

10. Central Comité der deutschen Vereine vom Roten Kreuz (Berlin) to Kriegsministerium Gefangenenschutz, 24 February 1916, BA R 67/1149. See also DanRK-Berichte.

11. Descriptions and reports of all delegations are in DanRK Berichte.

12. See September 1916 articles from the Wolff'schen Telegraphenbüro, *Rheinische-Westfälische Zeitung, Berliner Morgenpost, Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, and *Russkovo Slovo* in BA R 85/4540.

13. DanRK Berichte (Revertera-Vind Report); Anna Revertera, 'Als österreichische Rotkreuzschwester in Russland. Tagebuch von Gräfin Anna Revertera', *Süddeutsche Monatshefte*, no. 12 (September 1923), 252–82.

14. Huszar Report 1916, BA R 67/927.

15. Croy Report, July 1916–March 1917, BA R 67/1289.

16. Philipsen to Danish Red Cross-Copenhagen, 7 and 17 April 1917, RA DRK 10.001.A/157. Red Cross headquarters in Vienna resisted Kinsky's authorization, but she prevailed and remained in Russia until 1918. She survived the Russian tumults, married her fiancé, and lived to see her grandchild become the reigning prince of Liechtenstein. See RA DRK 10.001.B/25, Litra S.a. and Nora Kinsky, *Russisches Tagebuch 1916–1918*, Hans Huyn (ed.) (Stuttgart 1976) and Zdenko Radslav Kinsky, *Zu Pferd und zu Fuss: 70 Jahren aus den Erinnerungen* (Vienna 1974), 59–85; Heinrich Edler von Raabl-Werner, 'Schwester Nora Kinsky: Eine Heldin der Pflicht', W-K, II, 243–4.

17. Philipsen to Danish Red Cross-Copenhagen, 2 September 1916, RA DRK 10.001.A/157; Matilda Horn to Hauptmann (von Boenigk), 2 September 1916, BA R 67/927. Huszar may have been correct about Russian responses to Jews. Two Russian officers had already declined assignment to her delegation and one of the Russian teams in Austria had complained that Austrians favoured Jewish inmates as interpreters in the camps. See DanRK Berichte (Mylius-Maslennikow Report), 40, 44.

18. Hans Weiland, 'Kriegsgefangenenlager Krasnojarsk', in W-K, I, 181; Slatin to Huszar, 4 July 1917 and Soeur Andorine de Huszar, 'Propositions pour l'échange des tuberculeux', Petrograd, February 1917 and 'Mémoire', RA DRK 10.001.B/25, Litra C.a.; Huszar report, BA R 67/927.

19. DanRK Berichte (Passow and Drechsel Report); 'Bericht von Schwester Erika von Passow über ihren Besuch der Gefangenenlager in Russland und Turkestan', (Petrograd, 17 December 1916), BA R 67/926; Ernst Reissland, 'Erika von Passow zum Gedächtnis', W-K, II, 241–2. Anni Rothe, 'Bericht von Schwester Anni Rothe über ihre Reise durch die Gefangenenlager Süd-und Mittelrusslands', 4 July 1916–1 January 1917, BA R 67/926; 'Bericht von Schwester Emma von Bunsen über ihren Besuch der Gefangenenlager in Russland' (31 August 1916–11 January 1917), -/328 and (Tagebuch) signed by Emma von Bunsen, -/926. A second 'Tagebuch von Schwester Emma von Bunsen' covering her duty as a member of a German POW

evacuation team in 1918 is in BAMA MSg 200/46. Texts of public speeches in Germany by Passow, Rothe and Bunsen are in R 67/1120. Authoritative but sentimental evaluation of the German nurses is in Eduard Juhl, *Was Frauen Vermochten: Hilfe hinter Stacheldraht* (Schweren/Mecklenberg 1939) and 'Deutsche Schwesternhilfe hinter Stacheldraht', in Hanna Lieker-Wentzlau (ed.), *Elsa Brändström-Dank* (Eilenburg 1935), 43–56.

20. Bent Blüdnikow, 'Denmark during the First World War', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 24, 4 (October 1989), 685–703; Emil Friedrich to Üxküll, 12 January 1916; Üxküll to Boenigk, 2 February and 16 February 1916; Dithmer to Central-Comité-Berlin, 15 February 1916; Muus to Boenigk, 14 February 1916, all in BA R 67/1149. After the war Üxküll headed an ICRC commission in Upper Silesia, then became director of a sanatorium founded by Elsa Brändström. Countess Üxküll concluded her nursing career in 1938 as director of a German Red Cross hospital in Berlin-Lichterfelde. In 1944 her brother and three nephews, one of them Claus Schenck von Stauffenberg, were executed as members of the anti-nazi resistance. She was herself interned in a concentration camp, then placed under house arrest by the Gestapo. In June 1945 she retrieved Stauffenberg's children from incarceration. See Alexandrine von Üxküll-Gyllenband, *Aus einem Schwesternleben* (Stuttgart 1956); *8. Rundschreiben der Plennygemeinschaft Ostsibirier 1914/1920* (Weihnachten 1955), 6–10 (text of a lecture by Countess Üxküll on 24 April 1951), in BAMA MSg 200/270; Kurt Siebke, 'Ein Leben für Andere', -/415; Ursula von Kardorff, *Diary of a Nightmare: Berlin 1942–1945* (New York 1966), 202, 214; Peter Hoffmann, *Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat: Der Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler*, 2. ed. (Munich 1970), 636.

21. See Elsa Brändström, *Unter Kriegsgefangenen in Russland und Sibirien 1914–1920* (Berlin 1922, 1927); Hanna Lieker-Wentzlau (ed.), *Elsa Brändström-Dank* (Berlin 1938); Hans Weiland, 'Elsa Brändström. Caritas inter arma', W-K, II, 238–41. When the German Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv established a special collection of documents relating to prisoners of war, it dedicated the collection (*Militärgeschichtliche Sammlung 200*) to Elsa Brändström.

22. *New York Times*, 15 October 1916, III, 1:1.

23. Marye to Secretary of State, 15 March 1916, NA 763.72114/1352.

24. Devine to Francis, 16 May 1916, 763.72114/1651.

25. J.C. White, Memorandum on Care of German and Austro-Hungarian Interests in Russia, 15 April 1916, NA 763.72114/1603; circular letter to all embassies concerned with prisoner-of-war inspection, 17 April 1916, -/1463.

26. Gaston Lichtenstein, *Repatriation of Prisoners of War from Siberia: A Documentary Narrative* (Richmond, VA 1924), 9–17; Margaret Rush Gottlieb, 'Repatriation in Theory and in Practice throughout the First World War' (doctoral dissertation, Bryn Mawr College 1945), 300, 316.

27. The German and Austrian sisters' and prisoners' reports usually deplored America's official relief work, while praising the work of the YMCA. Anni Rothe's report was typical: 'What the Americans accomplished for our prisoners is difficult [to say]; what they neglected to do is easy to say. . . . A laudable exception is the work of the American Christian Young Men.' BA R 67/926. However, United States military intelligence suspected that YMCA delegates had been too friendly to Germans and that they were 'immature and more or less socialistically inclined'. See Secretary of War to Secretary of State, 30 December 1918, NA 763.72114/4277. See also Th. Geisendorf-Des Gouttes, 'L'Alliance Universelle des Unions chrétiennes de Jeunes

Gens et son activité en faveur des prisonniers de guerre', *Revue internationale de la Croix-Rouge* (1919), 418–19. Frederick Harris and others, *Service with Fighting Men: An Account of the Work of the American Young Men's Christian Associations in the World War* (New York 1922) is a rich source of information on the YMCA and prisoners of war in all countries.

28. Wilson to Tsar Nicholas II, 18 March 1915 (delivered 15 April), NA 763.72114/534 and Arthur Link (ed.), *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (Princeton 1966 —), XXXII, 396–7; Marye, 125.

29. Sazanov to Marye, 1 May 1915, NA 763.72114/551.

30. Marye to Secretary of State, 18 October, 23 November 1915 and 15 March 1916; NA 763.72114/894, 946, and 1352; Russian Embassy-Washington to Department of State, 16 March 1916, -/1365.

31. HLRK, *Interne Wochenbericht: Russland*, 73 (16 August 1916), BA R 67/1275; E. Schelde-Moller, *Thorvald Madsen: I Videnskabens og Menneskehedens Tjeneste* (Copenhagen 1970), 86–105. See also A.H. Brun, *Troublous Times: Experiences in Bolshevik Russia and Turkestan* (London 1931), 49, and Gottlieb, 126.

32. Francis to Secretary of State, 14 December 1916; 1 January 1917, NA 763.72114/2348 and 2280.

33. Brändström, 139; Streeruwitz, *Kriegsgefangene*, III, 54.

34. Wennerström, W-K, II, 291; Brändström, 139–40.

35. Central Comité der deutschen Vereine vom Roten Kreuz-Berlin to Auswärtiges Amt, 24 July 1915, BA R 85/4540; Bent Blüdnikow, *Krigsfanger-et billeddrama om krigsfanger i Danmark under 1. verdenskrig* (Odense 1988), 12.

36. Augusta Victoria participated in the selection of German sisters for the 1916 round. On her behalf, Prince Valdemar contacted Maria Fedorovna and Danish Queen Alexandrine contacted Empress Alexandra. Prince Max took a special interest in prisoners of war and had numerous connections with Russia at several levels. Maria Fedorovna was his aunt by marriage, Prince Valdemar and Prince Alexander of Oldenburg were his uncles, and Prince Carl was his cousin. See BA R 85/4541-2 and Max von Baden, *Erinnerungen und Dokumente* (Stuttgart 1968), 75–88. Prince Max advised Kaiser Wilhelm on conditions of POWs in Russia on 7 July 1915 and arranged a private communication with Maria Fedorovna through relatives in Denmark. Karl Scharping, *In russischer Gefangenschaft: Die kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Leistungen der deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in Russland* (Berlin 1939), 24. On the sensitive situation of Russian aristocrats with German connections, see the Croy report, BA R 67/1289.

37. Otto Spennhoff, 'Streiflichter aus dunklen Tagen: In russischer Kriegsgefangenschaft 1916–1921', BAMA MSg 200/131; Daurija Sammelbericht (a German Red Cross publication of excerpts from letters from Dauriia camp), -/132; Johann Spies, 'Die Schwester kommt: ein Kriegsgefangenulk', *Der Kriegsgefangene als Erzähler*, I, no. 2 (December 1923). See also W-K, II, 237–74.

38. DanRK Berichte. Texts of agreements and correspondence on the 1915 round of sisters' visits in Germany are in BA R 85/4540; the 1916 round is covered in BA R 67/1149.

39. Moskau Hilfskomité für Kriegsgefangene, Büro Kopenhagen to HLRK, 18 August 1917, BA R 67/1034.

40. Maslennikova to Danish Red Cross, 27 October 1920, RA DRK 10.001.B/25; Blüdnikow, *Krigsfanger*, 52, 76, 88.

41. Schelde-Moller, *Thorvald Madsen*, 86–105; Bericht von Prinzessin Cunigunde v.

Croy, BA R 67/1289; Philipsen to Danish Red Cross-Copenhagen, 11 August 1916, RA DRK 10.001.A/157. Printed reports on Russian sisters' visits in Germany are in BAMA MSg 200/236 (Bib) and official German responses are reported in BA R 67/1149 and R 85/4540.

42. Professor Stanislaus Trzeciak had travelled in the region in June–July 1916 and issued the controversial report. He made a second trip in September with Russian Red Cross delegate Gorenov and Sister Romanova, who took over distribution of relief supplies. See Bauer interview with Swedish Red Cross delegate Carl Rasch, 11 December 1916, BA R 85/4795.

43. See Croy report, BA R 67/1289. The Russian Foreign Office turned down an American embassy request to inspect the camps because an imperial order had transferred all German prisoners from the Murmansk project. See American Embassy-Petrograd to American Legation-Stockholm, 10 January 1917, BA R 85/4795.

44. Ernst Ritter von Streeruwitz, *Kriegsgefangene im Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918* (an unpublished 1918 manuscript in the library of the Heeresgeschichtliches Museum in Vienna), vol. 1, 67–107; the same author's published work, *Springflut über Oesterreich: Erinnerungen, Erlebnisse und Gedanken aus bewegter Zeit 1914–1929* (Vienna, n.d.), 86–101; Markus Graf Spiegelfeld, 'Kriegsgefangenenpolitik', in *Mitteilungen der Auskunftsstelle für Kriegsgefangene des Gemeinsamen Zentralnachweisebureaus* (Vienna), vol. I, nos. 5, 7, 9 (September–December 1917); and Heinrich Freiherr von Raabl-Werner, 'Oesterreich-Ungarns offizielle Kriegsgefangenenfuersorge', W-K, II, 324–31.

45. Margarete Klante, 'General Friedrich', *Der Heimkehrer: Verbandsblatt der Reichsvereinigung ehemaliger Kriegsgefangener*, XI, no. 12 (December 1930), 184–5. For organization of the Red Cross in Germany, see F. Grüneisen, *Das Deutsche Rote Kreuz in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* (Berlin 1939); BA R 67/Findbuch, i–v; Albert Schramm and Hans Bockwitz (eds), *Das Archiv des Ausschusses für deutsche Kriegsgefangene des Frankfurter Vereins vom Roten Kreuz*, Verband deutscher Kriegssammlungen, *Mitteilungen*, no. 1 (1921), 1–17; 'La Croix-Rouge de Francfort et sa section étrangère en faveur des prisonniers ennemis', *Revue internationale de la Croix-Rouge*, I, no. 2 (1919), 707-12.

46. See correspondence of HLRK and Moskau Hilfskomité für Kriegsgefangene, Büro Kopenhagen, BA R 67/842, 920, 921, and 841. See also Grant-Smith to Secretary of State, 9 November, 13, 21 December 1918. NA 763.72114/4164, 4242, 4275.

47. Durand, op. cit., 99–100.

48. See Karl E. Birnbaum, *Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare: A Study of Imperial Germany's Policy towards the United States, April 18, 1916–January 9, 1917* (Hamden, CT 1970 [c. 1958]), 70–92.

49. BA R 85/2128 and 4178-4180. The identity of the offending submarine was not published until years after the war in Arno Spindler (ed.), *Handelskrieg mit U-Booten* 4 vols (Berlin 1934), III, 177.

50. Brockdorff-Rantzau to Auswärtiges Amt, 16 April and 10 August 1916, BA R 85/2128.

51. Durand, op. cit., 99–100; Gottlieb, 272.

52. HLRK, *Interne Wochenblatt: Russland*, nos. 132–9 (20 April–12 October 1918), BA R 67/1277; Raabl-Werner, 'Oesterreich-Ungarns offizielle Kriegsgefangenenfürsorge', W-K, II, 329.

53. Brändström, 190–1. Soviet historiography has made much of the politicization of

prisoners of war. See Arnold Krammer, 'Soviet Propaganda among German and Austro-Hungarian Prisoners of War in Russia', Williamson and Pastor, 238–64.

54. On Bolshevik expectations regarding prisoners of war, see Karl von Bothmer, *Mit Graf Mirbach in Moskau: Tagebuch-Aufzeichnungen und Aktenstücke vom 19. April bis 24. August 1918* (Tübingen 1922). On the stranded Red Cross nurses, see Juhl, *Was Frauen Vermochten*, 60–83, and 'Dokumente über meine Tätigkeit als Mitglied der Fürsorge- u. Austauschkommission in Sibirien; meine Verhaftung als Delegierter wegen Spionage', BAMA MSg 200/31; Emma von Bunsen, Tagebuch, -/46; Hans Glahn personal documents and photos of Omsk subcommission, -/313.

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